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This paper presents a model of partial observability applied to the childcare market in 
Britain.  We simultaneously estimate the demand and use and calculate the excess 
demand for childcare. We find a large queue with nearly half of the mothers 
demanding childcare queuing for it.   We also find that formal and informal care are 
not substitute, implying that policies increasing the supply of formal care lead to an 
increase in the use of care rather than solely a shift from informal to formal care. This 
has implication on the efficiency of policies aiming at increasing the labour supply of 
mothers. 
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We also want to ensure that families have access to good quality 
childcare.  This matters to us all.  To the many parents - especially 
mothers - who are unable to take up job, education or training 
opportunities because childcare isn't available.  To businesses, who 
suffer when skilled and talented people are unable to take up work. 
[..] there are not enough childcare places, and ordinary working parents 
often cannot afford to take them up.   




“British childcare is worst in Europe” states a headline in The Independent 
newspaper (2.9.2001).  The claim is based on a study by the Daycare Trust that finds 
that the childcare provision in Britain comes close to the bottom among the 15 EU 
member states using measures such as publicly funded nurseries and parental leave.  
This finding is not good news for the current government that has been trying to get 
recognised for its family-friendly policies.  The National Childcare Strategy, recently 
launched by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, promises to raise 
the quality of childcare, making it more affordable, as well as increasing its provision. 
The government promises should be welcome to the general public.  A recent 
survey finds that 38% of parents think that there are not enough childcare places 
available and 43% say it is too expensive.  According to the Daycare Trust, the typical 
cost of a nursery place for a two-year-old is £5,700 a year (£7,000 in London), which 
is more than the average household spends a year on either food or housing.   
Furthermore, the government estimates that there are only 830,000 registered 
childcare places for the 5.1 million under 8-year-old children in England.  This 
potential shortage of childcare providers is likely to worsen with time as women are 
expected to fill 2/3 of all new job creations between 1998 and 2009 (Wilson, 2000).   
It is well documented that the labour force participation of mother’s of pre-school 
children is highly dependent on the price of childcare (see, for example, Blau (2001)   3
for a review, Powell (2002) for the US, and Duncan et al. (2001) or Viitanen (2001) 
for the UK).  However, these studies typically assume that the supply of childcare is 
perfectly elastic.  An exception is Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000) using the German 
Socio-Economic Panel supplemented by some regional information on the provision 
of childcare.  They use multinomial logit regression to estimate the labour market 
decision of mothers of at least one child less than 12 years old.  They find that 
childcare provision rate does not affect the labour force participation of German 
mothers but that prices do.  However, their results may stem from country-specific 
effects and sample selection; while the literature has concentrated on pre-school 
children, Kreyerfeld and Hank include mothers of older children. Chevalier and 
Viitanen (2001) explore the causality between female participation and supply of 
childcare in Britain.  Using aggregate data from the Labour Force Survey, they build a 
eight years time series and conclude that childcare Granger causes participation 
without feedback, which supports the claim that women could be constrained in their 
participation by the lack of childcare facilities.  The absence of a feedback mechanism 
implies that the supply of childcare is inelastic and does not react to an increase in 
demand
1.  Equilibrium is therefore reached either by a price increase or by the 
formation of a queue, which is consistent with the stylised facts. 
In this paper, we examine whether demand and supply of childcare are in a 
disequilibrium.  We use a method, first proposed by Poirier (1980) and Abowd and 
Farber (1982), in which a binary outcome (using childcare or not) reflects the joint 
unobserved binary choices of two decision makers.  In this case, a child is observed in 
childcare, conditional on the mother demanding it and childcare being available at her 
reservation price; this is referred to as a partial observability model.  The childcare 
                                                 
1 This is also of importance for simulations on the price of childcare on the mothers’ labour supply, 
which typically assume the perfect elasticity of the supply of childcare.   4
market is a sequential decision model with partial observability, as in Abowd and 
Farber (1982).  First, the mother applies for childcare and joins a queue of demanders.  
Then, childcare providers select individuals out of the queue and offer  places to 
individuals satisfying a decision rule (ranking by characteristics, first come/first 
serve).  Only children who have been accepted are observed using childcare.  After 
estimating the probabilities of demanding and receiving childcare, the size of the 
queue can be calculated.  While these models have been used to measure queues for 
union or federal jobs (see Heywood and Mohanty (1995) for example), we reckon that 
this paper provides the first application of partial observability estimation in the 
context of childcare.  Determining the size of the queue and the childcare arrangement 
of queuing mothers allows conclusions to be made on the efficiency of an increase in 
childcare supply on the female labour supply. 
We find that the queue for childcare is large.  The demand for childcare exceeds 
supply by more than 50%.    Since formal and informal childcare are not substitute, 
increasing the supply of childcare would reduce this bottleneck and likely lead to an 
increase in the labour force participation of mothers. 
 
2.  Economic model and econometric method 
 
Models of the demand for childcare typically compare the utility derived by the 
mother while using formal childcare and other forms of care.  However, comparing 
utilities only determines the demand for childcare (Abowd and Farber, 1982). In a 
partial observability model, the supply side of the market is also included; the 
assumption is that the decisions are taken by two agents but only the joint outcome is 
observed.  Thus, the final outcome reflects the decision taken on the supply and the   5
demand side and can lead to some conclusions regarding the equilibrium state of the 
market.  In the case of childcare, a child is observed in childcare if the mother wants 
to use childcare and a place is offered by a provider of care.  A child is not observed 
in childcare if the mother wanted to take care of the child herself or if the application 
of the mother to childcare was rejected by the childcare provider.  Formally, the 
probability of using childcare is given by the formula below: 
) 0 0 Pr( ) 0 Pr(
) 1 & 1 Pr( ) 1 Pr(
= = = =





       ( 1 )  
where C is the observed outcome of the use of childcare by mother i; D and O are 
unobserved and reflects respectively the demand for childcare and the offer of a 
childcare place to child i.  A childcare offer is always accepted by a mother 
demanding formal care.  To simplify the notations, we now drop the i subscript. 











        ( 2 )  
Where  xD and xO are vectors of characteristics explaining the demand and the 
acceptance of childcare.  These vectors typically will contain household, and local 
characteristics.  The random error terms ( D ε  and  O ε ) both follow a univariate normal 
distribution.  For the model to be identified at least one variable should be unique to 
xD or xO.  To identify the model, we rely on local authority information on the price 
and the provision of childcare.  The average price at the local authority level is a 
determinant of the demand for childcare only.  Childcare being a normal good, we 
assume that higher mean price would have a negative effect on the individual demand 
                                                 
2 The offer equation implicitly suggests that childcare providers use a ranking system based on the 
individual characteristics rather than operate a first come/first serve basis.  This assumption is not 
formally imposed in the empirical specification where identification comes from variations in the local 
supply and prices of childcare.   6
for childcare.  Additionally, childcare may be provided free of charge (usually to 
poorer working families, see Duncan and Giles (1996) for example). As free-fee 
carers were not included in the calculation of the average price, the proportion of 
children getting free care in the local authority is added. We also use identifying 
variables in the offer equation by including variables on the availability of childcare 
(expressed as a ratio for 100 children) for different types of providers.  Children aged 
less than 4 may be accepted in pre-school classes.  The provision of this alternative to 
childcare was, for the period of interest, non-compulsory and far from universal.   
Thus, as part of the supply of childcare, we include the proportion of 4 year old 
enrolled in education
3.  We assume that an offer is more likely to be made to 
individuals living in local authorities with a higher supply of care
4.   
In a sequential-decision model with partial observability, the second equation in 
(2) is conditional on  1 = i D . Formally, the system of equation (2) is equivalent to: 
) 0 Pr( ) 1 Pr( > = = D D x D β        ( 3 )  
) 0 / 0 Pr( ) 1 / 1 Pr( > > = = = D D O O x x D O β β       ( 4 )  
An offer for childcare is made only to mothers that were in the queue of women 
demanding childcare
5.  Thus, the distribution of  O ε  only exists for  D D D x β ε − >  and 
conditional on being in the queue for childcare the error terms  D ε  and  O ε  are 
independent. The likelihood function to maximise has therefore the following form: 
  ∏ ∏
= =
Φ Φ − Φ Φ =
0 1
)] ( ) ( 1 [ * )] ( ) ( [
D
O O D D
D
O O D D x x x x L β β β β     (5) 
                                                 
3 Since September 1998, each child aged 4 has a guaranteed access to a pre-school.  This has recently 
been extended to children aged 3 as well. 
4 This model therefore implicitly implies that the total supply of childcare has no effect on the 
individual demand for the service.  This assumption may be rejected if individuals faced with a low 
supply of childcare feel discouraged and do not apply. 
5 For a discussion on the differences between a simultaneous (as in Poirier) and sequential (as in 




The data comes from four waves of the Family Resources Survey (FRS) covering 
years 1994/5-1997/8
6.  The FRS is a continuous survey sponsored by the Department 
of Social Security for policy monitoring and the costing and modelling of changes to 
national insurance contributions and social security benefits in Great Britain.  The 
FRS includes a detailed questionnaire relating to benefits and childcare take-up and 
expenditure.  Unfortunately, the childcare section is routed and only families with at 
least one working adult have to complete it.  We restrict our sample to mothers aged 
18 to 59 with a least one child aged less than 5 (pre-school age), and drop families 
where no adult works.  To limit the bias resulting from this selection rule, we drop 
lone mothers from the sample as only a small proportion of working lone mothers 
were observed.  We define the use of childcare as using any type of formal providers 
of care; a detailed breakdown of the childcare providers is reported in Table 1.   
Childminders and nursery/playgroups are the main providers of formal childcare, but 
schools are also extensively used.  Working mothers used more formal childcare, 
especially childminders and nurseries/playgroups, but also more informal care.  Pre-
schools may not be an ideal arrangement for working mothers since this is the 
provider for which the smallest difference between the use by working and non-
working mothers is observed
7.  
 
                                                 
6 The definition of some local authorities was changed after 1998 hence breaking the series. 
7 On a similar note, Paull et al. (2002) note that the participation of mothers to the labour market does 
not jump when the youngest child reaches school age, thus undermining either that parental care 
prevented the mother from working or that schools are not a good alternative to childcare.   8
Table 1: Main providers of childcare 
  All mothers  Working mothers  Non working mothers 
Childminder 10.4%  17.0%  2.4% 
Nursery/playgroup 9.8%  16.3%  1.9% 
Creche 0.6%  1.1% 0.1% 
School 6.4%  8.4% 4.2% 
Informal provider  22.3%  37.1%  4.5% 
Parental care  50.5%  20.1%  86.9% 
 
 
The FRS is augmented with local authority statistics provided by the Department 
of Health, on the availability of various providers of childcare expressed as rates per 
100 children within the local authority (109 local authorities (LA)).  The childcare 
providers can be broken down in three categories: day nursery, playgroup, and 
childminder.  In this administrative data, the detailed provision of childcare by type of 
providers was for some local authority badly reported and we drop those for which at 
least one type of provider was missing for each of the four years (9 LAs were 
dropped).  We also impute the provision when some years were missing by using the 
rate reported the following year (or the previous year for 1997).  The provision of care 
at the LA level ranges from 850 places per 10,000 children to more than 6,000 (City 
of London).  City of London is a clear outlier since the second best LA only offers 
3,800 places.  To limit bias due to measurement error in this variable, we recode the 
supply distribution into quintiles. 
We also compute the average price for the different providers of care at the local 
authority level.  These calculations are based on the price paid by mothers using 
childcare in the FRS; therefore this implicitly assumes that all mothers within the 
same local authority are faced with the same price
8.  This calculation constrains us to 
group nurseries ,playgroups and crèche as the FRS does not distinguish between these 
                                                 
8 Powell (2002) on the contrary impute childcare prices for all individuals based on their own personal 
characteristics.   9
categories of childcare providers.  For each LA we calculate the average price for 
nursery and playgroup, and for childminder
9.  We also create variables on the 
proportion of children not paying for formal care and attending pre-school, to correct 
for the non-inclusion of children using free care in the calculation of the average price 
of childcare at the local authority level and the ratio of four years old in education. 
The decomposition of the data to obtain our final sample is presented in Appendix 
A1 and the summary statistics on the variables of interest are presented in Table 2, 
separately for all mothers and then by working status.  We have a sample of 5,825 
married/cohabiting mothers with at least one child under school age.  The average 
mother in our sample is aged 31 and left school at 17 and a half.  Women are slightly 
younger.  About 9% of women self-report themselves as being in bad health  and 6% 
are non-white. Nearly three quarters of the families, have only one child less than 5 
and only a marginal proportions have 3 or more children.  The presence of other 
children will affect the use of childcare by the mothers.  The effect of older children 
on the use of childcare is ambiguous and likely to depend on the age and gender of the 
older siblings.  Thus, we report the number of children aged 5 to 12 in the families, 
who may increase the preference for the mother to stay home and the number of 
teenagers aged 13-17 split by gender.  The father may also be able to provide some 
care.  Younger more educated fathers as well as those working less hours may be able 
to provide more childcare.  There are some variations in the provision of care at the 
local authority level. The average price per hour of childcare (deflated to 1997 prices) 
is slightly above £2 per hour for the two types of provider.  These prices are 
consistent with those reported by the Daycare Trust (~£80 per week).   
                                                 
9 Duncan and Giles (1996) report the hourly price of childcare for different types of providers.  Even 
though the distributions are quite different, the hourly price of nursery and playgroup are comparable.  
In 1991, 90% of users of nursery and playgroup were paying less than a pound per hour, while the 
average price for childminder care was above £1.00.   10
Nearly 50% of mothers of young children are participating to the labour market, 
and a quarter of those are part-timers.  It is important to notice the difference in the 
characteristics of working and non-working mothers.  Working mothers are five times 
as likely to rely on formal childcare, they have less children and the youngest child is 
on average 6 months older than for non-working mothers.  Their partners work two 
and half hour less in accordance with Becker’s internal division of labour within the 
household. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics- correct the mistakes esp on price of care 
  All  Mum not working  Mum working 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.
Use child care  0.2443 0.4297 0.0788 0.2695 0.3871 0.4872 
1 child aged 0-4  0.7270 0.4455 0.6435 0.4790 0.7931 0.4051 
2 children aged 0-4  0.2544 0.4356 0.3252 0.4685 0.1988 0.3992 
3 children aged 0-4  0.0185 0.1349 0.0313 0.1742 0.0081 0.0896 
Nbr Child aged 5-12  0.5845 0.7592 0.6035 0.8062 0.5683 0.7167 
Nbr girls aged 13-17  0.0240 0.1629 0.0264 0.1695 0.0215 0.1544 
Nbr boys aged 13-17  0.0247 0.1701 0.0275 0.1791 0.0229 0.1630 
Child age 4 in FT edu.  0.0642 0.2493 0.0404 0.1988 0.0816 0.2789 
Age of youngest child  1.7499 1.3752 1.4138 1.3499 2.0222 1.3327 
Dad years in education  17.4702 2.5054 17.5624 2.6018 17.3902 2.4213 
Dad hours worked  43.9409 14.0170 45.4070 12.1552 42.7590 15.1858 
Dad age  33.9013 5.7030 33.7209 5.7942 34.0795 5.5944 
Log household income  6.1909 0.5891 6.0802 0.6316 6.2809 0.5341 
Mum education  17.5353 2.2687 17.4534 2.2680 17.5947 2.2493 
Mum work full time  0.3535 0.4781      0.6390 0.4804 
Mum work part time  0.1317 0.3382      0.2481 0.4320 
Mum self-employed  0.0597 0.2370      0.1129 0.3166 
Mum age  31.4999 4.8064 31.2290 4.9699 31.7287 4.6267 
Mum non white  0.0591 0.2357 0.0754 0.2642 0.0426 0.2019 
Mum bad health  0.0877 0.2829 0.0958 0.2944 0.0823 0.2749 
Price nursery/playgroup  2.1675 0.3976 2.1707 0.4058 2.1794 0.3684 
Price childminder  2.0651 0.3514 2.0743 0.3471 2.0714 0.3415 
Nurseries/playgroups per 100  18.5579 5.9461 18.7642 5.9314 19.0664 5.4920 
Childminders per 100  6.5959 3.3318 6.6360 3.2999 6.6352 3.3644 
LA % age 4 in FT edu.  0.2355 0.0785 0.2341 0.0770 0.2286 0.0721 
LA % free childcare  0.0173 0.0109 0.0172 0.0107 0.0194 0.0097 
        
Observations  5,825 2,983 2,842   11
 
4. Results 
Since the use of childcare is mostly confined to working mothers, the results will 
be presented first for all mothers and then specifically for working mothers.  As the 
decision to work and to use childcare are not independent, the results are biased, 
providing a lower band on the size of the queue for childcare.   
The model includes the variables presented in the summary statistics as well as 
regional and year dummies.  The provision of nursery/playgroup and childminder 
places at the local authorities are recoded into quintiles to reduce the bias due to 
measurement error. 
The composition of the household is clearly an important determinant of the use 
of childcare.  Families relying on parental care can expect economies of scale when 
taking care of more than one young child.  Those economies are not likely to be 
redistributed to the parents using childcare, thus we expect that more young children 
will reduce the use of formal childcare.  The presence of young school age children 
may also increase the preference for the mother to stay home and take care of her 
youngest child, some possible economies of scale for the mother are also possible; 
thus the presence of older siblings may reduce the use of childcare.  Teenagers (aged 
13-17), in a household may provide informal childcare and reduce the demand for 
formal care.  This provision of care by teenagers may be dependent on their gender, 
with females providing more care than male teenagers.  The age of the child affects 
the probability of relying on formal childcare in a positive way.  First, mothers are 
guaranteed some maternal leave (see Waldfogel, 1998 for details)  and the preference 
for taking care of one’s own child may be higher, the younger the child is.   12
Additionally, the provision of childcare for very young children is limited, reducing 
the possibility of using childcare for babies. 
As the role of women in the society has changed in the past three decades, we 
expect some cohort effects in the use of childcare, with younger more educated 
couples more likely to use childcare.  Parental labour force participation should also 
be associated with a greater use of childcare. For both parents, and especially the 
mother, labour force participation and childcare use are endogenous since the two 
decisions are taken simultaneously.  As we do not have valid instruments in the data 
to identify the decision to work independently of the use of childcare, we only stress 
that the estimates on labour force participation could be biased.   
The mother’s health may have ambiguous effects on the use of childcare. On one 
hand, if the health conditions reduce the probability of working then it may reduce the 
need for childcare.  On the other hand, serious health problems may prevent the 
mother from providing care herself and thus increase the demand for formal childcare.  
This estimate is likely to be affected by measurement error. The ethnicity of the 
mothers may also affect her choice of childcare, but the direction of the effect is likely 
to be specific to unobserved characteristics (mother’s integration, proportion on non-
white in the neighbourhood). 
Finally, we expect childcare to be a normal good and higher local prices should 
lead to a reduction in the use of childcare.  Similarly, the proportion of free providers 
in the local authority should be associated with an increased use of childcare. Since 
the data was collected before it was made compulsory for schools to offer places for 
below school-age children, there is quite a large variation between local authorities.     13
Table 3: Probit: Estimates of demand for childcare (All mothers)  








Mum age  0.1482 **  0.0511  0.2561 **  0.1118  -0.0340  0.1382 
(Mum age 
2)/10  -0.1893 **  0.0762  -0.3677 **  0.1682  0.0783  0.1990 
Mum education  0.0633 **  0.0113  0.1659 **  0.0328  -0.0392  0.0322 
Mum bad health  0.0198  0.0729  0.2003  0.1621  -0.1965  0.1564 
Mum non white  -0.3421 **  0.1073  -0.1885  0.3194  -0.4684 *  0.2706 
Mum full time work  1.1859 **  0.0508  -0.1924  0.3806  2.0057 **  0.1608 
Mum part time work  0.5901 **  0.0667  -0.5454 *  0.3306  1.2913 **  0.2177 
Mum self-employed  0.6712 **  0.0850  -0.2486  0.3290  1.1030 **  0.1929 
2 kids aged <4  -0.0831  0.0558  -0.3320 **  0.1227  0.2374 *  0.1404 
3 kids aged <4  -0.2180  0.2094  -0.5373 **  0.7781  0.1459  0.6850 
Nbr kids aged 5-12  -0.2588 **  0.0327  -0.1852 **  0.0669  -0.2574 **  0.0706 
Nbr girls aged 13-17  -0.3894 **  0.1454  -0.4276 *  0.2446  -0.1427  0.4014 
Nbr boys aged 13-17  0.1693   0.1174  0.3514  0.3205  -0.0773  0.2814 
Age youngest child  0.2636 **  0.0179  0.1892 **  0.0431  0.2758 **  0.0402 
Ln income  0.2636 **  0.0438  0.6579 **  0.1067  -0.1276  0.1133 
Dad age  0.0311  0.0358  -0.2045 **  0.1022  0.2051  0.0906 
(Dad age
2)/10  -0.0402 0.0472 0.3081  ** 0.1437  -0.2906 0.1162 
Dad education  0.0409 **  0.0103  0.0667 **  0.0249  0.0190  0.0221 
Dad hours worked  -0.0001  0.0015  0.0035  0.0026  -0.0058  0.0035 
LA price nursery/playgroup  0.0411  0.0612  -0.0153  0.0916     
LA price childminder  -0.0091  0.0785  -0.1278  0.1200     
LA % free provider  6.0075 **  2.0394  8.7453 **  3.1855     
LA supply nursery quint 1         -0.1526 0.1585 
LA supply nursery quint 2         -0.2134 *  0.1297 
LA supply nursery quint 3         -0.0775 0.1285 
LA supply nursery quint 4         -0.3031 **  0.1160 
LA supply childminder q 1         -0.1325 0.1304 
LA supply childminder q 2         0.0984 0.1165 
LA supply childminder q 3         0.0685 0.1192 
LA supply childminder q 4         -0.1913 *  0.1150 
LA % kids 4 in school         1.3250 **  0.5752 
Constant  -8.7556  0.8130 -9.1041 1.8753 -3.4775  2.5443 
          




2(33)=1575) -2385.4  (Chi
2(73)=1706) 
Note: Dummies for the 10 administrative regions and 4 years were also included. ** and * refers to 
significance at the 10% and 5% level.   14
Some promoted the inclusion of children in school at the youngest age either 
because it is thought to be beneficial for the child (see Duncan and Giles (1996) for 
some evidence) or as a cheaper alternative to the provision of childcare while others 
did not offer the option at all. 
We first estimate the constrained version of the model where there is no queue.  
This is equivalent to assuming that the supply of childcare is perfectly elastic and that 
a childcare place is always provided to a mother demanding childcare. This is a 
special case of the queue model, which is formally equivalent to imposing 
) 1 Pr( ) 1 Pr( ) 1 / 1 Pr(O   i,   i = = = = = = ∀ i i i C D D .  This model can be estimated as a 
univariate probit for the use of childcare (Table 3, columns 1 and 2). 
With the no queue model specification, we can reject that the explanatory 
variables have no power; the log likelihood is -2450.9, which gives a likelihood ratio 
test of 1575 significantly higher than the critical value for a Chi-square with 33 
degrees of freedom.  Most of the expected relations hold.  Younger more educated 
parents, working mothers and wealthier white households are more likely to use 
childcare.  The presence of other children aged 5 to 12 increases the preference for the 
mother to take care of her children herself.  Female teenagers appear to provide some 
care for their younger siblings but not teenage boys.  Surprisingly, the number of 
children aged less than four has no significant effect on the demand for childcare.  
The proportion of free providers is associated with a greater probability of use but 
surprisingly the local prices of childcare are not significant determinants of the use of 
childcare. The price of playgroup/nursery is even positive, which could reflect a 
quality issue, where parents unable to appreciate the quality of the provider of care, 
rely on the price as an indicator. If parents have a preference for quality but are not   15
able to observe it, they use price as an indicator of quality
10.  The unpredicted effect 
of the price of playgroup/nursery on the use of childcare may also be a consequence 
of the grouping of providers.   
The no queue model has a significant amount of explanatory power: the use of 
childcare is correctly estimated for 80% of the observations, but to answer the 
question of interest we now shift our attention to the queue model.  Columns 3 to 4 in 
Table 3 reports the estimates for the demand of childcare and columns 5 to 6 those for 
the acceptance into care.  The maximum log likelihood value is –2385, which 
compares favourably with the -2451 in the no queue model.  The likelihood ratio test 
reaches 130.94 while the critical value for a Chi-square with 39 degrees of freedom is 
54.29 at the 5% confidence level, hence the no-queue model is rejected. 
The estimates of the demand for childcare are similar to those obtained for the use 
of childcare.  The main differences are that the number of children under five in the 
family negatively affects the demand for childcare, as was expected in a model of 
economies of scale in the production of childcare by the mother.  The prices of the 
two types of providers have a negative effect on the demand for childcare, through 
both are insignificant.  It can be noted that the demand for childcare is about 10 times 
more sensitive to the price of childminder than the price of nursery/playgroup.  Powell 
(2002) similarly finds that the mother’s employment-childcare choice relationship 
was more sensitive to changes in the price of sitter than in the price of centre. More 
surprisingly, the mother’s participation to the labour market is now associated with a 
reduction in the demand for childcare compared to non-working mothers.  We do not 
have a good explanation for these results that are likely to be due to the endogeneity 
of the participation and demand for childcare decisions.   
                                                 
10 Mocan (2001) reveals moral hazard issues, with providers investing in the quality of easily to 
observe (bythe parents) items rather than items directly related to the quality of the care provided. Blau 
(2001) also shows that parents are not good at assessing the quality of the childcare providers.   16
The childcare offer estimates are presented in the last two columns of Table 3.  
This equation is identified by the exclusion of the local authority price of childcare 
variables and the inclusion of dummies for the supply of childcare in the local 
authorities.  The supply is separated between playgroup/nursery and childminder, and 
reported in quintiles (the omitted quintile represents the highest supply for 100 
children).  The last identifying variable measures the proportion of children aged 4 
registered in school within the local authority of residence. The supply of childcare 
has roughly the expected effect on the probability of being offered a childcare place.  
Mothers living in better endowed local authorities are more likely to be accepted than 
others.  However, despite the large variation in the provision of childcare, this effect 
is not really strong and does not appear to be linear.  For childminders, only one 
quintile is associated with a significant effect and a couple of quintiles have effects 
with the wrong sign.  The provision of education for children aged 4 is, on the other 
hand, strongly associated with an increase in the probability of using childcare.   
The other variables affecting the likelihood of an offer being made are mostly due 
to the labour force participation of the mother.  Working mothers are more likely than 
non-participating mothers to be offered a place for their child.  The effects are ordered 
with full time employed mothers having the greatest chance of an offer and self-
employed mothers the lowest.  This could indicate that self-employed mothers are 
expected to be more flexible in their working patterns in order to accommodate work 
and parental care. This pattern may also reflect a process by which providers rational 
the queue; offering places to mothers that are thought to be more needing.  Having 
more than one child under the age of five increases the chances of an offer being 
made.  Older children are more likely to be accepted than babies, which could be 
related to regulations (Children Act 1988) increasing the number of staff for children   17
under the age of 2.  Since childcare is a labour intensive activity, providers may have 
an incentive to focus on older children in order to maximise their profits.   
Providers of care appear to discriminate in favour of white mothers but not against 
the poor.  This could be a selection effect since poorer families are less likely to 
demand childcare in the first place.  Surprisingly, mothers with bad health are not 
more likely to be offered a place with their children, which is likely to be due to the 
definition of bad health (self-reported) in the data.  It is not clear how providers 
allocate childcare.  If personal characteristics had no effect on the probability of 
receiving an offer, this would indicate the use of a first come/first serve allocation 
model, but we only find a few significant personal variables thus not fully supporting 
a ranking model. 
As the demand for childcare is strongly affected by the working characteristics of 
the mother, and since the labour force participation of the mother is endogenous, we 
also conduct the analysis on a sub-sample of working mothers.  Not accounting for 
the selection effects, these results will provide a lower band on the demand and queue 
for childcare for working mothers.  The results for this sub-sample are presented in 
Table 4. 
Most of the results of the no-queue model are similar to those presented for the 
full sample. We reject the hypothesis that the specification used has no explanatory 
power (Chi
2 (32)=600).  To summarize briefly; younger, wealthier, more educated 
white parents with only one child of pre-school age are more likely to use childcare. 
Other children in the household reduce the probability of using childcare.  Mothers 
working part-time or being self-employed are less likely to use childcare than full-
time employed mothers.    18
Table 4: Probit: Estimates of demand for childcare (working mothers)  
  No queue  Demand  Offer 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Mum  age  0.1667**  0.0662 0.1864** 0.0846  -0.2604  0.2796 
(Mum age 
2)/10 -0.2135**  0.0997  -0.2441*  0.1299  0.3757  0.3834 
Mum  education  0.0769**  0.0148 0.0942** 0.0196  0.0067  0.0434 
Mum bad health  0.0126  0.0937  -0.1286  0.1039  1.4302  1.0602 
Mum non white  -0.3963**  0.1443  -0.3644  0.2284  -0.4984  0.5041 
Mum part time work  -0.5492**  0.0672  -0.6725**  0.0836  0.4341  0.3501 
Mum self-employed  -0.4855**  0.0868  -0.4899**  0.1155  -0.1632  0.2643 
2 kids aged <4  -0.2446**  0.0723  -0.2089**  0.0942  -0.2010  0.2722 
3 kids aged <4  -0.4146  0.3169  -0.6929**  0.3475  6.1920  0.1669 
Nbr kids aged 5-12  -0.3352**  0.0425  -0.2626**  0.0569  -0.4645**  0.1453 
Nbr girls aged 13-17  -0.3819**  0.1771  0.3794  0.4304  -1.6022**  0.3891 
Nbr boys aged 13-17  0.2336  0.1586  0.2128  0.2217  0.1191  0.4456 
Age  youngest  child  0.2022**  0.0229 0.2204** 0.0290  0.0623  0.0921 
Ln  income  0.3935**  0.0688 0.7239** 0.0862 -0.6770**  0.2355 
Dad age  0.0445  0.0428  -0.1292*  0.0720  0.3212*  0.1691 
(Dad age
2)/10  -0.0570  0.0560 0.2102** 0.1022 -0.4870**  0.2089 
Dad  education  0.0494**  0.0136 0.0612** 0.0187  0.0050  0.0421 
Dad hours worked  -0.0010  0.0018  0.0027  0.0024  -0.0219**  0.0071 
LA price nursery/playgroup  -0.0083  0.0850  -0.0551  0.0990     
LA price childminder  -0.0472  0.1013  -0.1141  0.1149     
LA % free provider  7.8973**  3.0268  9.4128**  3.4819     
LA supply nursery quint 1         -1.0756** 0.4868 
LA supply nursery quint 2         -1.1250*** 0.4096 
LA supply nursery quint 3         -0.7321** 0.3653 
LA supply nursery quint 4         -0.7510** 0.3213 
LA supply childminder q 1         0.3869 0.3168 
LA supply childminder q 2         0.3997 0.3110 
LA supply childminder q 3         0.5359 0.3261 
LA supply childminder q 4         -0.1478 0.2493 
LA % kids 4 in school         0.6542 1.3221 
Constant -8.9481  1.0652  -8.9281  1.3696  6.3270  5.1487 
          
Observations  2,842  2,842 
Log Likelihood  -1596.8 (Chi
2(32)=600)  -1547.1 (Chi
2(71)=699) 
Note: Dummies for the 10 administrative regions and 4 years were also included.  
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The local price of childcare has the expected effect on the use of childcare; 
working mothers are less likely to use childcare in areas where childcare is more 
expensive and more likely to use it in areas where a larger proportion of childcare is 
provided free of charge to the parents. 
Shifting our attention to the queue model, a likelihood ratio rejects the no queue 
model at any level of significance (Chi
2(39)=99).  The demand estimates are similar 
to those obtained for all mothers, but on this sub-sample, the working patterns of the 
mother have the expected effect on the demand for childcare.  Employed mothers 
working full time are likely to be the least flexible with their time, while part-time 
workers and self-employed may be able to provide most of the childcare themselves 
and rely on their partners or informal care for the rest of the time.  The offer estimates 
are rather different from those obtained on the full sample.  Women working part-time 
or being self-employed are as likely, conditional on having demanded, to receive 
childcare than women working full time, while in the full sample, we had a clear 
ranking.  We no longer observe discrimination against non-white in the provision of 
care, but this may be due to the small number of working non-white mothers.   
Similarly, the coefficients on the number of children under the age of 5 may be 
affected by the small number of observations.  The age of the child does not appear to 
affect the probability of having an offer made as there is less variation in the age of 
the children for working mothers. The reduced variation stems from the endogeneity 
between the decision to go back to work by the mother and the age of the child.  As 
can be seen in the summary table, working mothers have children that are older than 
non-working mothers.  Mothers in local authorities where more playgroups and 
nurseries are available are more likely to be offered a place in childcare.  This effect is 
almost ranked and appears to be fairly large even for the fourth quintile.  On the other   20
hand, neither the supply of childminders nor the availability of pre-school classes 
have a significant effect on the probability of having a demand for childcare accepted. 
The demand (3) and offer (4) equations allow us to calculate the proportion of 
mothers asking for childcare and the size of the queue for childcare
11.  These 
decompositions of the population of mothers are reported in Table 5 for all mothers 
and for working mothers only. 
 
Table 5: Predicted probabilities in the use of childcare 
  Full sample  Working mother 
Pr (D=1)  0.503  0.433 
Pr (O=1/D=1)  0.473  0.974 
Pr (O=0/D=1) * Pr(D=1)  0.265  0.011 
 
Looking at the full sample, 50.3% of mothers of pre-school children would like to 
use formal childcare, however only 47.3% of these demands are accepted. This 
implies that 26.5% of mothers do not get the care provision that they would like (row 
three).  The shortage of childcare in the UK is extremely important. It is interesting to 
compare these figures with the use of childcare by providers as reported in Table 1.  
The model does a good job at predicting the use of childcare, more importantly it 
appears that the size of the queue is nearly similar to the proportion of mothers using 
informal childcare.  In the next section, we will explore this issue of whether the 
informal sector accommodates for the unsatisfied demand for formal childcare. If this 
is the case a policy increasing the supply of formal care would only shift users from 
                                                 
11 The probabilities are estimated for each individual. The mean probability for the population is 
thereafter calculated.   21
informal to formal childcare and thus be unlikely to have large effects on the labour 
supply of mothers
12. 
For the sub-sample of working mothers, the results appear contra-intuitive.  Only 
43% of them would like to use childcare and for those who do 97% are accepted, 
which indicates that there is no queuing for childcare for working mothers. However, 
these results may be due to rational expectations and reverse causality.  Mothers who 
would like to work but realise that they are unlikely to be granted a formal care place 
may decide not to work. By excluding this type of women, our sub-sample reduces 
the real demand for childcare.  Also working mothers who do not rely on childcare 
may have some good reasons not to, hence they do not demand formal care. 
 
5.  Simulations and policy recommendations 
 
From the full sample, we noticed that the size of the number of women in the 
queue for childcare and the number of women relying on informal childcare were 
similar.  If informal care only captures mothers who have been rejected from formal 
childcare then policies aiming at increasing the use of formal childcare (usually in 
order to increase female labour supply) would mostly shift children from one type of 
care to another and hence are likely to have no substantial effect on the female labour 
supply.  If on the other hand, the queue is mostly composed of women who are taking 
care of their children themselves, then a policy of increasing the supply of formal 
care, would free these mothers from part of their parental care duties and may allow 
them to participate in the labour force.  In Table 6, we report the actual and predicted 
                                                 
12 A policy of shifting from informal to formal sector may be desirable, even if no effect on the labour 
supply of mother is expected, if the quality of the care provided is higher in the formal sector.  The 
relative quality of the two sectors is difficult to judge. Relatives may be full of good intentions but does 
that make them good carer, on the other hand, formal care may be less good than the one provided by 
the experienced neighbour.    22
use of care
13.  The predictions of the model are reasonably accurate, nearly 60% of 
formal care users are assigned to the correct category.  The bulk of the queue is 
represented by mothers using parental care; while 55% of mothers are relying on 
parental care in the population, their proportion in the queue reaches 78%.  It thus 
appears that formal and informal childcare are not substitutes.  The majority of 
mothers who do not get access to formal childcare take care of their children 
themselves rather than rely on informal care.  This behaviour may be due to concerns 
about the quality of the care provided in the informal sector.  Thus, the lack of formal 
childcare is a bottleneck that forces mothers of young children to provide parental 
care rather than possibly participate in the labour force.  Policies reducing this 
constraint may therefore be efficient at increasing the proportion of young mothers 
working. 
 
Table 6: Origin of mothers queuing for childcare 
 Predicted 
Observed  Not demanding  Queuing  Using care 
Parental care  1945 1076  218 
Informal care  705 95 368 
Formal care  402 198 818 
 
The traditional complaints about childcare in the UK concern the scarcity of the 
supply and the high costs.  We simulate the effects of changing these characteristics 
on the demand and the queue for childcare.  Since we have used variations in prices 
and supply to identify respectively the demand equation and the offer equation, 
simulated policies have to affect both prices and supply in order to affect both 
                                                 
13 Individuals with a predicted probability greater than 0.5 were coded as 1. Thus, these results slightly 
differ from those presented in Table 5 where the actual probabilities were used.   23
equations.  We simulate four policies whose effects on the demand and the queue for 
childcare are reported in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Effects on demand and queue for childcare (Full sample) 
  Currently  Pol 1  Pol 2  Pol 3  Pol 4 
Pr(D=1)  0.503  0.512 0.507 0.512 0.516 
Pr(O=1/D=1)  0.473  0.481 0.481 0.500 0.507 
Pr(O=0/D=1)  *Pr(D=1)  0.265  0.266 0.263 0.256 0.254 
Policy 1: Mean price at LA reduced by 10%, Provision of school in Education increased by 10% 
Policy2: Proportion of free providers at LA increased by 10%, Provision of school in Education 
increased by 10% 
Policy 3: Mean price at LA reduced by 10%, supply shifted by one quintile 
Policy 4: All of the above simultaneously 
 
The policies have the expected effects.  Reducing the price of childcare or 
increasing the supply of free-care increases the demand by about a percentage point 
[how does that compare with other UK stuff…Duncan? Ian and Gauthier??] while 
increasing the supply increases the probability of an offer for childcare being made.  
We cannot comment on the relative efficiency of one policy versus another one, since 
the interventions simulated here are not in the same metrics.  Current childcare 
policies such as Working Families Tax Credit may only lead to an increase in the 
queue if the supply of childcare does is inelastic. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have examined the determinants of childcare demand in the UK for mothers 
of pre-school age children. For the first time in this type of analysis, we account for 
partial observability; a woman uses childcare if she demands it and if her offer is 
accepted.  We found an excess demand for childcare in the UK.  The size of the queue 
for childcare is substantial: while a bit more than 50% of mothers would like to use 
childcare, only 47% are provided with a place for their child. Furthermore, the queue   24
is underestimated since we have imposed the exogeneity of the mother’s labour force 
decision. 
Finally, informal and formal childcare are not perfect substitutes and a majority of 
women queuing for childcare take care of their children themselves rather than relying 
on informal care.  This means that policies increasing the supply of childcare, would 
free these women from childcare duties and thus may have some positive impact on 
their participation to the labour force. 
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Appendix A1: Data. 
FRS 94/95 to 97/98 
All mothers with child less than 4:   10,738 
Married/cohabiting mothers:    -2,409 
At least one working adult in HH:  -1,169 
Unclear family relations:    -531 
Missing  LA:     -490 
Other missing variables:    -314   26
APPENDIX: The childcare providers in the UK 
Registered childminders are self-employed child-carers who look after the 
children in their own home.  They must be registered with the local authority (LA) 
and inspected once a year.  Childminders can care for up to six children aged under 
eight of whom no more than three must be aged under five, at any one time.  They are 
limited to one or two babies at one time.  The childminders set the charges themselves 
and there is no national rate, however, most charge between £60 and £120 per child 
per week for full-time care.  The average price at the national level reported by the 
Daycare Trust is £88.87. 
Preschool playgroups usually provide play and education sessions lasting about 
2½ to three hours.  They are also registered and inspected by LA.  Some provide free 
early education and are inspected by Office for Standard in Education (OFSTED).  At 
least half the staff must be trained to work with children.  It is recommended that 
there is one member of staff for every eight children aged three to five and one adult 
for every four children aged two to three, also, often parents help out.  Preschools cost 
between £2 to £5 per session.   
Nurseries look after and educate children aged 0-5.  They are registered and 
inspected by the LA.  There are different types of nurseries: private, local authority, 
community (non-profit), and workplace.  At least half the staff must be trained.   
Staffing levels are: one for every child between three to five years old, one for every 
four children aged two to three and one staff for every three children aged under two.  
Most nurseries provide between 26 and 40 places.  The expected price per child per 
week is between £80 and £180 and the average price for full-time care for a two-year 
old is £110.49 (Daycare Trust). 